Part four: other role-players. - Free Online Library

1. INTRODUCTION

Government policy and strategies (see Part 1) specifically place

emphasis on the notion of integrated government, thereby involving other

government departments, as well as on partnership involving key

stakeholders--from the business community in particular. This section

contains four contributions, two each concerning the public and the

private sectors respectively.



Within the public domain, the active participation in the combating

of crime by local authorities especially within urban areas, is

emphasised. Hence the contribution by the Director of Communication:

Office of the Chief of Police, Mel Vosloo, on the Tshwane Metropolitan

Police that covers the roles, strategy, functions and key performance

areas of this police department at the local tier of government. At the

national level, within the broader context of the constitutional and

JCPS Cluster framework, the secondary functions and role of the South

African National Defence Force (SANDF) in co-operation with the SAPS in

combating crime are dealt with by Senior Staff Officer: Operations Land

Internal and Borderline Control of the Joint Operations Division of the

SANDF, Col Barry Schoeman. Apart from covering the statutory mandate of

the SANDF in this regard, as well as current levels of co-operation, the

main thrust of this contribution deals with shifts in the SANDF force

employment strategy as a result of which the 'support to the

people' role of the SANDF is compromised by the imperative of the

'promote regional security' role. This in effect means that

although the SANDF will always be available to be of assistance to the

SAPS, its regular force deployments in support of the SAPS are scaled

down in order to support the Government's regional peace

initiatives in the form of peace support operations.



Within the domain of the private sector, the 2003 Executive

Overview of Business Against Crime (BAC) provides an overview of the

major initiatives and activities of BAG in partnership with Government.

Established in 1996 as a non-profit organisation, the private sector

funded BAG played a major role in drafting the NCPS. Since then it has

been extremely active as a private sector partner to combat crime and

the causes of crime, mainly by operating at strategic and project

implementation levels and by interacting with the Government on

ministerial and departmental level within the JCPS Cluster. The

Executive Overview covers the approach and funding of BAC, as well as

the projects the organisation is involved in and its achievements in

respect of each project. The article by the Director of the Institute

for Strategic Studies, University of Pretoria, Prof Mike Hough, provides

an analysis of the private security sector in South Africa. Apart from

an overview of the kinds of services this sector provides, it

specifically looks at the official views on and statutory provisions

regulating the private security sector, in the process also assessing

whether private and public security in South Africa compete or

co-operate with each other.

2. THE POSITION OF KEY ROLE-PLAYERS



TSHWANE METROPOLITAN POLICE



Mel Vosloo



Director Communication



Office of the Chief of Police



Tshwane Metropolitan Police Department



1. INTRODUCTION



The City of Tshwane Metropolitan Police Department was established

on 24 January 2002 in accordance with a business plan approved by the

Council on 4 October 2001 and a proclamation in the Gauteng Provincial

Gazette by the Member of the Executive Council (MEC): Safety and

Liaison. The business plan described the vision, mission, values and

core business of the Department. The functions of the Department and the

additional resources and financial implications also formed part of this

business plan. The first phase made provision for the establishment of

the Department and the second for its progressive expansion until the

end of the 2002/2003 financial year. From this point normal Council

budgetary procedure applies.



2. ROLE OF THE METROPOLITAN POLICE



The role of the Tshwane Metropolitan Police Department is

determined by the needs and demands of its clients, the municipality and

the community, and to some extent by political responsibility and

strategies applied to meet the demands of the various role-players.



2.1 Client system needs

The escalating demand for a safe and secure environment due to the

high crime rate is the main reason for the existence of the Metro Police

Department. It is wrongly perceived that the Metro Police duplicates the

services rendered by the South African Police Services (SAPS). It has to

be stressed that the Metropolitan Police Department's focus is on

pro-active crime prevention in supporting the SAPS and on ensuring a

safe and secure environment, rather than acting on events. Due to the

high crime rate, all members of the community reserve the right to

demand a safe and secure environment.



2.2 Municipality needs



The establishment of the Metropolitan Police is directly linked to

the Municipality's mission to stimulate and nurture a safe

environment in which growth and development can flourish so that

everyone can experience quality of life. For this to happen it is

essential to meet the whole community's need for safety and

security; once this is in place the community can grow and flourish.

Notwithstanding this priority, financial constraints force the use of

alternative ways to deliver services. It is furthermore expected of the

Municipality to render an equal service to all residents. This

expectation has led to a shift in the priorities of the Metro Police

Department as well as a move towards addressing services that were not

rendered on an equal basis. As a result services have been

decentralised, leading to decreased reaction times in response to

complaints.



The Municipality expects clean administration from the policing

service. To spend the ratepayer's money with caution, this entails

tighter budget control and the strengthening of support services to

assist the operational management with accountability and effective

control over resources. Resource services supply valid up-to-date

management information including treasury services, logistical services

and personnel services.



2.3 Community needs



The needs of the community to live, work and play in a safe

environment is recognised as a high priority. This item first emerged

during the Integrated Development Plan (IDP) process. Tshwane prides

itself on being the safest city in South Africa. The community, however,

has limited resources to spend on safety and security and therefore

demands value for money and to be kept informed of all functions.

Ratepayers at all levels also want equality of services and should pay

for services rendered. Since policing is a basic service it should be

equal for all residents.



2.4 Political needs and demands



The political will requires a safe and secure environment for the

electorate: this promise was made by each and every councillor and

should be adhered to. Democracy generated new and sometimes unrealistic

demands. As a result the policing service finds itself at the centre of

the political process and often finds it difficult to attain its goals

due to political intervention. At the national level politicians are

placing more pressure on services in general. The national

government's policies force the policing service to consider

alternative ways of rendering services in public/private partnerships.



2.5 Accommodation of needs and demands



With the necessary resources and funding the police service has the

ability and dedication to render an affordable, professional and

efficient service. There are, however, several factors that make the

policing service unique and that require unique solutions. These factors

are the following:



--Most services are rendered on a 24-hour basis.



--The services are labour intensive.



--The services demand the use of expensive technical equipment.



--The client is dealt with under abnormal circumstances, for

example in an emergency situation or when guilty of an offence.



--The rendering of services requires a well-trained and dedicated

force.



The Metropolitan Police Service's ability to render a law

enforcement service resides in several strengths and opportunities, also

considering that the prevailing climate in a democratic South Africa

necessitates continuous changes. The foundations of the policing service

in this changing environment are the following:



--Most services are rendered in accordance with statutory

requirements.



--In some areas well-established infra-structure exists, which can

be extended to all other Locksmith Cape Town areas.



--The personnel corps comprises well-trained and dedicated

professionals.



--Operational control is well established.



--The principle of functioning on a decentralised basis has been

anticipated.



--The metropolitan police concept is accepted nationally as well as

internationally.



2.6 Limiting factors



The main obstacles to the desired state of affairs are to be found

in the organisation itself. The first is to get rid of a culture of

average performance by replacing it with a goal-driven, responsible

culture. In this way existing resources can be utilised much more

effectively. This should be supported by scientific research and

technology, presently largely lacking. Secondly, specialised units with

different functions should be replaced with multi-skilled task forces.

For example, by-law enforcement across the whole spectrum should be

controlled by one section instead of by various sections scattered

throughout the Municipality. The luxury of separate traffic, security,

guard and crime prevention units cannot be afforded and these functions

must be combined in and executed by a multi-skilled task force.



2.7 Contributing factors



The strategic direction of service rendering on which the policing

service must embark, is supported by the fact that many services can be

delivered at the same standard but at a much lower cost than by private

organisations. This gives the policing service the ability to save on

costs and also the freedom to redeploy resources where they are needed

most. Another contributing factor is the fact that the improvement of

the level of services can be achieved internally by establishing

multi-skilled task forces, adopting a goal-directed management approach

and utilising research and technology. A final contributing factor is

the existence of the political will to address the safety and security

situation in Tshwane.



3. STRATEGY



In order to formulate a strategy, certain 'reality

clusters' were considered. Firstly, if the trust and sustained

co-operation of the community are to be gained and maintained, local

government has to ensure a clean administration which is visible to the

community. This Department has successfully maintained this vision,

supported by intensive media coverage of all suspensions and dismissals

of wayward staff. It has in fact given credibility to this process

publicly and privately by assuming a policy of zero tolerance.



Secondly, the Department has made inroads to as many community

forums as possible, including Community Policing Forums (CPF), in a bid

to stop possible vigilantism--a threat, that if ignored or minimised,

could be a serious mistake. It is the policy of this Department to

address community concerns as soon as possible and to stay involved

until the concerns are properly addressed. Failing this, vigilante organisations could develop into powerful forces that are organised and

capable of transgressing the law. Problems are dealt with by producing

reasonable and accurate statistics proving or disproving the

community's perceptions. An aggravating factor is that compared to

most other societies, South Africa's crime-infected society

requires above-average initiatives and sustained measures.



4. FUNCTIONS OF THE METROPOLITAN POLICE



The three main functions of the Metro Police Department are, inter

alia:



--crime prevention;



--by-law enforcement; and



--road policing.



All other functions of the Department support these functions.



The principle guidelines to operationalise the strategy are as

follows:



--decentralised command and control;



--crime prevention through community participation;



--reorganising patrol methods;



--community accountability and ownership; and



--increased service delivery.



The Metro Police Department is an inclusive service that functions

throughout the entire Tshwane area on an equal basis.



The minimum national standards stipulated by the South African

Police Service Act, 1995 (Act No 68 of 1995), section 64L are adhered

to. They deal mainly with:



--the carrying out of arrests and the incarceration of arrestees;



--the management of crime scenes;



--the standardisation of forms;



--occurrence books;



--pocket books; and



--search and seizure procedures.



4.1 Regionalisation

Policing in the Tshwane area was regionalised for the following

reasons:



--shorter reaction times;



--geographical obstacles;



--the fact that areas differ in crime patterns and statistics;



--infra-structural obstacles; and



--to coincide with SAPS precincts as far as possible.



Eight regions were eventually demarcated.



5. KEY PERFORMANCE AREAS



5.1 Office of the Chief of Police



The Office of the Chief of Police has to strategically manage the

Metropolitan Police in the following areas:



--crime prevention;



--by-law enforcement;



--road safety;



--to contribute to corporate strategy, initiatives and budget

responsibility;



--to provide strategic leadership in the above-mentioned areas; and



--to allocate, manage and optimise the use of resources.



5.2 Crime prevention



5.2.1 Social crime prevention



--Manage and oversee crime prevention programmes; and



--design, implement and maintain new crime prevention programmes.



5.2.2 Specialised crime prevention



--Manage and oversee specialised crime prevention programmes; and



--design, implement and maintain new specialised crime prevention

programmes.



5.2.3 Strategy development



--Manage and oversee strategies for crime prevention; and



--develop, test and implement new strategies for crime prevention.



5.2.4 Environmental design and re-design



Examine present environmental design and develop and implement a

new design that is safety and security friendly.



5.3 Policing



Manage and oversee:



--centralised policing operations;



--decentralised policing operations (regions); and



--road policing operations.



5.4 Road policing operations



Manage and oversee operations of:



--speed control;



--highway patrol; and



--specialised road safety services.



5.5 By-law enforcement



Manage and oversee:



--the by-law section by applying general management principles;



--the compliance of by-laws in all eight regions;



--the co-ordination of all by-law operations; and



--participation in the introduction of new by-laws.



5.6 Research and technology



--Gather data on crime trends;



--process data and disseminate information on crime trends; and



--investigate and activate new data sources.



5.7 Academy



Manage and oversee:



--the presentation of accredited statutory courses/own courses;



--the presentation of in-service training; and



--develop and implement new courses.



5.8 Support services



--Manage and oversee all administrative support services provided

to the Department; and



--develop, implement and maintain new support systems.



5.9 Administration Bureau



--Manage and oversee the administrative functions of the Bureau;



--develop and implement new strategies;



--monitor and control employee wellness;



--manage and oversee prosecution administration;



--maintain good relations with the Department of Justice;



--maintain and oversee the traffic court's functions; and



--maintain and oversee the tracing unit functions.



5.10 Licensing services



--Maintain and oversee the statutory licensing functions with

regard to motor vehicle licenses and registration, drivers'

licenses and inspectoral functions;



--manage trade licenses, NATIS system administration and archive

services; and



--develop, implement and maintain new systems.



6. CONCLUSION



The practical situation thus far is that the Department has

achieved most of its objectives. The only outstanding aspect, due to

slow processes that have to be followed, is the finalisation of the

appointment and placement of personnel in accordance with the structures

prescribed by the laws and policies of both the Council and national

government. The encouragement of personnel to comply with the vision and

mission of the Department is an ongoing process that is also receiving

attention.



THE SANDF AND THE COMBATING OF CRIME: MAKING A DIFFERENCE? *



1. INTRODUCTION



Before discussing the current or future level of co-operation

between the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) and the South

African Police Service (SAPS), it is important to draw attention to the

statutory mandate of the SANDF and its current employment by the

President. It is also important to gain an understanding of the current

dilemmas of the SANDF and of the political vision of the Government that

may impact on SANDF co-operation with the SAPS in the fight against

crime in South Africa.



2. THE SANDF'S STATUTORY MANDATE



According to the South African Constitution, 1996 (Act No 108 of

1996) section 200(2), the SANDF's main or primary function is to

"defend and protect the Republic, its territorial integrity and its

people in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of

international law regulating the use of force". The interim 1993

Constitution (article 227) also made provision for the secondary

functions of the SANDF. These functions, that were since reiterated by

the White Paper on National Defence for the Republic of South Africa,

1996 are:



--the fulfilment of the international obligations of the Republic

of South Africa;



--the preservation of life, health or property;



--the provision or maintenance of essential services;



--the upholding of law and order in the Republic in co-operation

with the SAPS; and



--support of any department of state for the purpose of

socioeconomic upliftment.



According to Section 201 (2) of the Constitution, the employment of

the SANDF in the undertaking of these secondary functions requires

presidential authorisation. The President has, in accordance with these

powers vested in him, employed the SANDF in three of these functions:



--Fulfilment of the international obligations of the Republic (the

deployments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia and

Eritrea (all United Nations [UN]-mandated) and Burundi (UN-endorsed).



--The preservation of life, health or property (support to the

Department of Provincial and Local Government for disaster management).



--The upholding of law and order in the Republic in co-operation

with the SAPS (Presidential Minute 27 of 1996--18 June 1996--according

to the National Crime Prevention Strategy--NCPS).



This article focuses on the latter function. The intended 18-year

lifespan of the NCPS is to last until 2014, thus it is taken for granted that the employment will remain valid until then. Based on the

presidential authorisation, the Minister of Defence instructed that the

employment be effected in the entire area of the Republic of South

Africa.



3. THE CURRENT LEVEL OF CO-OPERATION PROVIDED BY THE SANDF TO THE

SAPS



Since the authorisation of its employment by the President in 1996,

the SANDF has mainly co-operated with the SAPS in three major fields:



--Borderline control.



--Rural protection.



--Combating of serious crime, namely:



--Urban terrorism (in the Cape Metropolis).



--Stabilising of areas where violence is endemic (in the

KwaZulu-Natal Midlands).



--The safeguarding of major events (for example, elections and

events of international importance such as the Non-Aligned Movement Summit and the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting).



The force levels deployed were compromises between the maximum

force level possible within the SANDF's budget constraints and the

requirements of the SAPS. In the recent past this has led to only the

priority requirements being catered for, which can be summarised as

follows:



--Borderline control. An average of 13 companies were deployed

along the Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Swaziland and Lesotho borders.



--Rural protection. An average of 23 Territorial Reserve Force

platoons were deployed.



--Combating of serious crime. An average of six companies were

deployed.



--22 Aircraft (fixed and rotary wings) and ships (primarily harbour

patrol boats) were used where and when required to support SANDF

elements, and on request to support SAPS elements.



Due to both political and financial constraints, the SANDF has been

withdrawn from all internal operations other than borderline and rural

safeguarding. Should the need for SANDF crime fighting assistance arise

within the urban or peri-urban areas, special motivations will have to

be provided and specific criteria met, before such assistance would now

be forthcoming. The force levels for the border areas have also

decreased from 13 to 11 companies. The excess forces are now used for

foreign deployments.



Despite these force reductions, the SANDF was still able to achieve

some notable operational results (see Tables 1 and 2).



It is clear that the SANDF plays a major role in combating crime in

these focus areas. The reduction in force levels inevitably impacted on

the results obtained and prevented the SANDF from providing anything

resembling blanket coverage along the priority border areas. This meant

in practice that the SANDF and SAPS local commanders were forced, more

so than before, to plan deployments to achieve reasonable results. The

results provide proof of the good co-operation between the forces,

especially at tactical level. Along the South African borders SANDF

patrols are not required to operate together with SAPS patrols, but in

practice this often occurs.



4. THE WAY FORWARD



The SANDF has now reached that critical point where decisions are

taken with consideration of the need to be active within the African

context. This is a political imperative and it also ensures that the

SANDF is ready to serve South Africa as required by the Constitution.

The current deployment of the SANDF within South Africa in co-operation

with the SAPS must be seen against this background. The choice forced

upon the SANDF is the product of budgetary constraints and the vision of

the Government to stabilise the Southern African Development Community

(SADC) region as a prerequisite for peace, progress and tranquility in

South Africa.



To deal with this problem the Department of Defence has, for the

first time in its history, developed a single comprehensive military

strategy to provide guidelines for future development and structures.

Using the military strategy as a basis, the SANDF has developed a force

employment strategy.



4.1 SANDF force employment strategy



The military strategy identified 37 missions derived from the

Constitution, the Defence Act, 1957 (Act No 44 of 1957 as amended) and

governmental directives, and also identified three military-strategic

objectives. The 37 missions were divided into the three

military-strategic objectives that are to be operationalised within the

force employment strategy. These objectives are:



--Support to the people.



--Promote regional security.



--Defence against aggression.



The force employment strategy covers an 18-year period, divided

into three phases of six years each. The strategy acknowledges the fact

that the dividing lines between the phases are not clearly delineated,

but are drafted for the purpose of presenting the strategy. According to

the force employment strategy, the 'support to the people'

objective is the most important objective for the first phase.



The 'promote regional security' objective is, however,

also important and is expected to replace the 'support to the

people' objective as a priority over time. Currently no immediate

threat is identified, thus the low priority of 'defence against

aggression'. If regional security can be promoted successfully all

three objectives will merge over time (see Figure 1).



[FIGURE 1 OMITTED]



The strategy makes provision for a Stage 1 where the force levels

allocated to co-operate with the SAPS will remain constant to a point in

time, after which they will decrease progressively or decrease as a

result of a growing requirement to promote regional security. The SANDF

will utilise SANDF force design capabilities and

commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) type of equipment to reduce the running

costs of the support provided. As the internal situation becomes the

SAPS sole responsibility, the SANDF role will change from intensive

deployments to a form of interactive missions utilising reaction forces

to stabilise the situation and so prevent specific illegal cross-border

movement and the plundering of economic resources. The strategy also

states that a multi-national approach needs to be followed to deal with

illegal border crossings. This means that as of now, and even more so in

future, the SANDF must in co-operation with the SAPS involve the

security forces of neighbouring countries to jointly combat illegal

cross-border activities. The SANDF internal role changes will not affect

its commitment to support other government departments, in particular

the utilisation of the SANDF planning capability during crises. The

level of involvement will be determined by the concept of selective

engagement. It is therefore important that permanent co-ordinating

mechanisms at all levels are maintained, staffed and improved to ensure

good co-operation between government departments.



4.2 Military strategic end-state



The strategy also developed a new military strategic end-state for

withdrawal from the internal situation that is summarised as follows:



--The internal situation is under control, which does not

necessarily imply that the crime situation has reached the desired

level, but rather that the SAPS can control it on their own.



--Appropriate technology and intelligence-driven operations to

allow for effective utilisation of resources to prevent:



--illegal cross-border movement;



--trans-national crime; and



--the plundering of resources.



--The SANDF's inherent capabilities are utilised to assist

other government departments at their request and cost.



4.3 Future SANDF co-operation with the SAPS in the future



The SANDF will scale down regular force deployments along the

borderline over the next six years. The process of handing it over will

be planned and step-by-step, as each party declares its ability to

transfer and to take over an area. The SANDF will always be available to

be of assistance to the SAPS or indeed other government departments

under certain defined circumstances.



The SANDF will also progressively exit from the rural safeguarding

environment. It will still continue to assist the SAPS when requested,

but these deployments will be to stabilise volatile areas and will be

high-density intelligence-driven operations of short duration.



The safeguarding of major events such as international conferences,

visits of foreign dignatories, and international sporting events will,

however, be managed at the cost of those who request it.



5. CONCLUSION



In conclusion, the main driver of the SANDF's strategy to

scale down internal deployments over the next six years is the need to

support the Government's regional peace initiatives. The effect of

this on the SAPS and other departments is recognised, but the SANDF does

not have the resources to simultaneously operate both internally and

externally at the level of commitment required by the Government. The

SANDF will, however, remain involved in internal operations for as long

as the SAPS is unable to operate without SANDF support or resources. The

SANDF will indefinitely remain on standby to be of assistance to any

department as is required by the Constitution, given that certain

defined criteria have been met. The use of the naval and air resources

of the SANDF by other government departments will, however, continue as

long as necessary as an essential cost-saving measure.



BAC EXECUTIVE OVERVIEW OCTOBER 2003



Business Against Crime South Africa



PREFACE



The major initiatives and achievements of Business Against Crime

(BAC) are described in some detail in this document ... (that also

includes) a number of recent highlights ... extracted to serve as a

quick reference.



Firstly, BAC has appointed a new Chief Executive Officer ... who

will build on past achievements whilst looking towards a greater

realignment with all stakeholders to ensure a future and continued

relevance. It is important for BAC to maximise its impact within

government beyond the current set of projects and to maintain the

ongoing support of business, and especially to secure support from the

black business sector.



The Partnership with government continues to grow in its

acceptance, influence and international recognition as a unique and

effective approach to addressing crime combating strategies.



The projects continue to achieve in excess of expectation, some

however are long-term interventions that do not deliver immediately

measurable results, nevertheless their achievements continue to be

recognised. A few of the most recent highlights are listed below:



--The Criminal Justice Strengthening Programme has successfully

completed its extended pilot on the restructuring of the manner in which

courts are organised and managed and will be rolling out its

Professional Court Management Model throughout KwaZuluNatal and Gauteng

during the remainder of this year.



--The Organised Crime Programme, focusing on Vehicle Crime, has

effectively brought the fraudulent re-registration of stolen vehicles

under control, significantly improved the control of border posts and

has been instrumental in the establishment of a special anti-hijack task

team by the South African Police Service (SAPS) that has significantly

reduced hijackings in Gauteng over the past three months.



--A special unit has been established to accelerate the

investigation, prosecution and conviction of bank and CIT robbers. In

the past two months more than 50 cases have already been prepared for

trial, many of which would most likely never have been tried. Through

the co-ordinated participation of all parties a greater number of

robbery attempts have also been foiled.



--The new Specialised Commercial Court Centre in Johannesburg hasl

increased conviction rates three-fold and the number of cases completed

by ten-fold, rapidly moving towards the improvements recorded by the

Pretoria Pilot initiative. This is soon to be followed by establishments

in Durban, Port Elizabeth and Cape Town.



--The Case Row Management system of the IJS programme has

effectively implemented its performance measurement systems, which has

already been rolled out to over 40 major courts, and is now able to

recognise and reward the achievement of top performing courts and also,

and more importantly, to identify under-performers and devise corrective

action.



--The Victim Support Programme through which victims of crime are

counselled both for trauma and in judicial rights and processes has

expanded the number of counselling centres to 157 from which some 80 000

victims are assisted annually.



1. INTRODUCTION



This document provides an executive overview of the activities that

Business Against Crime (BAC) is engaged in, and progress made in this

business-driven initiative that is managing the implementation of

measures, in partnership with government, to improve the effectiveness

of the criminal justice and crime combating process.



It is appropriate to review the origin and objectives of BAC in

order to place the activities and achievements in context.



2. BAC OVERVIEW



Business Against Crime was established as a non-profit

organisation, initially funded by its Founding Sponsors, in response to

President Mandela's request in 1996 "for the private sector to

partner the government in combating crime and the causes of crime".

Subsequent to this BAC companies were registered in each major province,

all of which focus on a common goal and provide implementation capacity

for the provincial roll-out of national priority initiatives.



The role that BAC fulfils on behalf of South African Business is

to:



--Influence crime combating strategy, policy and priorities.



--Transfer business skills to government without creating a

dependency.



--Show that business is visibly committed by creating a channel for

business involvement.



--Develop and maintain the public/private partnership, to shape a

mutually agreed vision and to drive working solutions that achieve

project goals.



BAC therefore supports the government as catalyst, facilitator,

consultant, project manager and capacity builder.



BAC's activities, in the role it plays, are funded entirely by

private sector sponsorships and donations whereas the capital and

operational cost of the criminal justice service is funded by the

government.



BAC is therefore not an alternative source of Government funding,

nor is it a lobby group and will not act on behalf of the Government.



3. HOW BAC OPERATES



BAC operates at strategic and project implementation levels and

interacts with government on ministerial and departmental level within

the 'justice cluster'. BAC does not take over the

responsibilities of government but rather provides additional skill and

focus to drive solutions successfully.



The BAC approach is therefore by means of clearly defined

strategies and projects that provide solutions to high priority crime

combating initiatives. The key projects, achievements to date and future

activity objectives, are summarised in this document. It is worth noting

that significant successes have been achieved in all areas of BAC

supported activity.



4. THE BAC APPROACH



The priorities for improvement in the delivery of the criminal

justice service have been set and are being addressed by the government

with BAC's assistance as described below.



Diagram 1 describes the focus of BAC's activity:



[ILLUSTRATION OMITTED]



There are six core project areas in which BAC is presently engaged,

which are:



--An Integrated Justice System.



--Commercial Crime and Fraud.



--Organised Crime--syndicated crimes.



--CCTV--Surveillance Systems.



--Service Delivery Improvement at police stations.



--Tiisa Thuto--conflict resolution and crime prevention in schools.



5. FUNDING OF BAC ACTIVITY



BAC, originally funded by its founding sponsors, extended its

source of funding to the broader based business sector to meet the

funding requirements of the scope of the initiatives listed above. Not

only do these contributions, which are in cash and in kind (business

skills), provide the much needed funding that enables BAC to positively

bring about change, but they are also an indicator of the commitment of

business to support the change process.



Current contributors fall into four categories:



--Founding sponsors and patrons, who provide core funding of BAC

activity in the range from R350 000 to R1 000 000 per annum over a three

to five year period.



--Major sponsors, who have committed in excess of R150 000 as a

single or an annual payment



--Sponsors and donors, who commit less than R150 000 as a single or

an annual payment. Payments are often made as a monthly contribution



--Partners, who contribute an initial fee of R25 000 and ongoing

maintenance support to BAC's SPPS Programme (Support Partnership

Police Station).



Funds are designated, at the sponsor's request, towards a

specific project or to the BAC initiative in general, where BAC directs

the funds in terms of specific, strategic or project needs.



BAC is fiercely results-oriented and sharply focused on adding

value, and is committed to providing regular progress reports in terms

of general and project achievements.



Sponsorship benefits, over and above participation in BAC public

activities include:



--Tax deductibility of contributions.



--Appropriate recognition and visibility in BAC's marketing

and communications programme and various crime prevention and

information-sharing initiatives.



--Presentations of analysed and evaluated current data.



6. OVERVIEW OF PROJECTS



6.1 Integrated Justice System (IJS)



The goal of the IJS is the transformation of the current Justice

System into a modern, efficient, effective and integrated process to

deliver swift justice through improved business processes supported by a

modern technology infrastructure across all criminal justice programmes.

The Programme will ensure that criminals are effectively managed through

the process of investigation, prosecution and incarceration and that

state resources are optimised and effective.



Special Achievements



To date, pilot implementations have produced benefits such as:



--96 infrastructural/process improvements have already been

implemented.



--IJS Court Centres--the implementation of court centres with

reengineered procedures have brought about several performance

improvements, including:



--the average time taken to prepare a case for trial has been

reduced by 40 per cent; and



--an improvement in cases disposed of by up to 124 per cent at one

court, with the national average showing a steady increase at 58 per

cent over the last 18 months.



--The Awaiting Trial Prisoner Project in Port Elizabeth--has

reduced detention cycle times by 28 per cent from 122 to 87 days,

thereby reducing costs by R8 million and relieving the overpopulation problem in our jails. Indirect annualised savings amount to R110

million.



--The disappearance of police dockets in Court Centres has reduced

from an average of 27 per month to NIL.



--The Criminal Record System--the availability of criminal records

improved in phase one from 97 to 35 day. Now with the AFIS (Automated

Fingerprinting Information System) this has been further reduced to

seven days.



Key future activities include the development and implementation of

the technology infrastructure, the business information system, the

integrated case management system and the further restructuring of

courts to improve workflow efficiency.



6.2 0rganised Crime



The Organised Crime Portfolio focuses on large scale syndicated

crimes with the major focus on vehicle theft and hijackings as well as

copper cable and cellular telephone theft.



The approach is to remove the commercial benefit from trading in

stolen vehicles and vehicle parts by preventing the illegal

re-registration or export of whole vehicles and the trade in second hand

parts originating from stolen vehicles.



This is being done by improving processes and information, by

uplifting skills and management, by countering corruption, by closing

down illegal operations and by ensuring that cases are properly

investigated and perpetrators effectively punished.



Special Achievements



--The rooting out of fraud and corruption and improving service

delivery at motor vehicle registration offices. Implemented at 30

registration offices in Gauteng, it is currently also operational in

selected offices in Mpumalanga, North West and Eastern Cape. The

so-called best practice model (BPM) is aimed at reducing the illegal

registration of an estimated 55 000 stolen/hijacked vehicles per year.



--To date over 200 cases of suspected fraud have been reported,

with several internal disciplinary actions brought about.



--Service levels have also improved, and at the main Loveday Street

registration office queue times have been reduced from three hours to

under a half hour.



--The various vehicle information data bases have been linked to

facilitate information sharing.



--Several vehicle recovery operations have been initiated,

co-ordinated and executed, involving various responsible departments, in

which over 100 criminal cases have been opened and 80 stolen vehicles

and 23 000 parts recovered in operations on vehicle 'chop

shops'.



--The increased vehicle identity verification programme by Border

Police had by the end of 2002, achieved successes in the seizure of

approximately 2 800 stolen vehicles at border posts, with a value in

excess of R220 million.



--A national roll-out programme will follow.



Key future activities include a Justice right-sizing initiative to

improve service delivery of the Department of Justice, a project to

reduce crime in the retail sector and a narcotics initiative.



6.3 Commercial Crime



The Commercial Crime project has created an environment for the

successful, effective and efficient investigation, prosecution and

adjudication of fraud and corruption which causes 30 per cent of all

business failures, consumes 3-5 per cent of turnover, affects 86 per

cent of South African business and costs the country upward of R40

billion per annum.



The project focuses on commercial specialisation, the principle of

prosecution-led investigation, workflow and productivity management

systems and controls and the development of professional skills through

training and mentorship programmes.



Special Achievements



--The initiative has produced excellent results at the Commercial

Crime Court in Pretoria.



--The number of convictions has increased from 15 per annum to 16

per month--a 1 200 per cent increase.



--A 92 per cent conviction rate.



--45 per cent of cases are finalised within one year compared with

three to five years previously.



--Court utilisation has improved, exceeding the national average by

22 per cent, and backlogs are down.



--Appropriate sentences are being passed--with 33 per cent of the

convicted being jailed without the option of a fine.



--Early achievements at the recently opened Johannesburg Commercial

Crime Court show a 100 per cent conviction rate during their first

quarter of operation.



--The major successes of the programme for prosecution by private

counsel, both in respect of successful prosecution and the transfer of

knowledge and capacity building of state advocates.



Key future activities include the continuance of the mentorship and

skills development programme for prosecutors and investigators, the

handover of the workflow and productivity management systems as well as

the technology implementation for the management of documentary

evidence.



Plans are already in place for the opening of Specialised

Commercial Crime courts in Durban, Cape Town and Port Elizabeth by the

end of 2003.



6.4 CCTV Surveillance



The Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) Surveillance Project designs,

implements and manages international-standard surveillance systems in

partnership with the SAPS, metropolitan councils and other law

enforcement agencies in major urban centres where street crime is

prevalent and law enforcement officers on the street have declined.



The core focus is the effective installation and operation of

infrastructure, procedures, management and skills development.



Special Achievements



--Surveillance Units have been established in Cape Town and

Johannesburg.



--ISO 9002 accreditation has been awarded for the documented

procedures as validated against the Johannesburg installation.



--The results have seen a decline of 80 per cent in street crime in

areas covered in the Cape Town CBD with an equivalent improvement being

recorded in Johannesburg in the first year.



--Responses of SAPS reaction units to the crime scene are now less

than one minute.



--Video footage of crimes has been accepted as prima facie evidence in court.



--The many successful sightings of criminal activity that have

resulted in the arrest and conviction of the perpetrators.



Key future activities include the extension of Surveillance

Technology implementations to other major centres in Gauteng and other

provinces.



6.5 Service Delivery Improvement in Police Stations



The objective of the Support Partnership for Police Station

Programme (SPPS) is to support one of the SAPS' four strategic

priorities of service delivery improvement by bringing business

expertise and resources in a planned, measurable and sustainable way to

a police station with the objective of capacitating its members thereby

enabling them to render an improved service to the communities they

serve.



The SPPS brings a business to partner with a police station for the

benefit of the community represented in the partnership by the Community

Police Forum, the process being initiated, facilitated, guided,

monitored and evaluated by Business Against Crime.



Based on the model below (Figure 2) the programme focuses and

evaluates the partnerships on addressing and achieving a set of criteria

that would most impact on the service received in the areas of a police

station most utilised by the community.



[FIGURE 2 OMITTED]



Special Achievements



--The programme has inducted 49 partnerships in Gauteng since 1998.



--The programme commenced in Mpumalanga during 2002 and to date 15

partnerships have been inducted in that province.



--Eight Community Service Centres (formerly Charge Office) have

been renovated.



--Three training rooms have been equipped.



--10 Victim Support facilities have been equipped.



--13 stations have had training in telephone skills.



--A variety of other interventions such as computer literacy,

Powerpoint presentation skills, driver training, absenteeism reduction,

workshops with prosecutors, have taken place in different stations.



Key future activities include:



--Focussing all partnerships simultaneously on the same set of

service delivery improvement criteria during 2003.



--The introduction of an evaluation process during 2003.



--Extending the programme to all 121 police stations in Gauteng.



6.6 Victim Support Programme



The Victim Support Programme run by the SAPS in conjunction with

Business Against Crime has steadily expanded since its inception four

years ago. Until recently victims of crime and violence had neither

recognised rights nor adequate recourse to the criminal justice process.

Recognising this, government launched the National Crime Prevention

Strategy (NCPS) Victim Empowerment Programme. This provided a link for

the first time between the work of departments such as the SAPS, Social

Development, Health, Justice and Correctional Services in partnership

with non-governmental and community based organisations.



Victims of crime and violence suffer emotional trauma, which often

results in psychological and physical symptoms. Volunteers are trained

to provide support through the criminal justice process--from the time

of the initial reporting of the crime at the station to the closing of

the case, which includes:



--basic practical and emotional support;



--to recognise post-traumatic stress symptoms; and



--to refer traumatised victims (who may require professional

counselling)



to appropriate services providers in the community.



Special Achievements



--The original Victim Support Programme has been improved,

internationally benchmarked and reprinted. 2 500 Volunteers have been

recruited and trained to work in 120 operating centres that today manage

more than 5 000 cases of victimisation monthly.



--Over 1 000 participants have been exposed to the Partnership

programme and experience gained is being used in the further development

of the programme. A performance measurement system is in the progress.



Future Activities



The programmes currently running in Gauteng, Mpumalanga,

KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape, will be rolled out nationally over

the next 12 months.



6.7 Tiisa Thuto



Tiisa Thuto meaning, 'We Strengthen Education' has as its

main objective the development of a positive morality, improved

interpersonal relationships and a reduction in the levels of crime at

schools so that teaching and learning can take place more effectively.

This is achieved by working with learners, educators, parents and the

local police towards nonviolent methods of conflict resolution and

problem solving.



The project was introduced in 44 schools (four communities) in

Soweto and has produced not only a significant improvement in individual

educational achievements but also a reduction in crime, improvement in



moral standards and the more effective operation of communities in

general.



Special Achievements



The project has been independently audited and the following

achieve highlights recorded:



--Pass rates are up in Thiisa Thuto schools by an average of 78 per

cent on 1999, with 100 per cent being reported in some schools.



--There has been a 70 per cent increase in attendance at school

initiated activity.



--Communication between teachers and parents has risen from 0 per

cent to 28 per cent.



--Home discipline has improved.



--Teachers and School Governing Bodies have tackled as much as 87

per cent of crime-related issues.



--Acts of aggression and violence are down by 72 per cent.



As a result of these achievements the United Nations Development

Programme (UNDP) has endorsed the programme by adopting the model as the

standard to be rolled out nationwide.



Key future activities



The rollout phase is currently under way and has reached the

following areas:



--Gauteng: 312 schools in Tshwane, Katlorus (East Rand), Alexandra

and Orange Farm.



--Limpopo: 162 schools in all 30 districts.



--Free State: 12 schools in Villiers, Frankfort and Steynsrus.



--The Western Cape, Eastern Cape and KwaZulu Natal are to be

implemented in 2003.



6.8 Criminal Justice Strengthening Programme (CJSP)



The Criminal Justice Strengthening Programme is a strategic

partnership initiative, managed by BAC and funded by USAID, aimed at

supporting and strengthening the capacities of the Department of Justice

and Constitutional Development's (DOJCD) core business function

(that is Prosecution, Court Services and Adjudication) as well as their

support services (for example financial operations, the Justice College)

and the related strategic alliances (that is SAPS, DCS, DSD), in order

to provide all South Africans more effective and accessible justice

whilst maintaining citizen confidence in democratic governance.



The CJSP is made up of four sub-programmes.



Court Services



--The Decentralised Court Support Services Project focuses on the

development and implementation of an organisational structure for the

effective management of shared services and non-shared (core) functions

to get cases to flow and be adjudicated timeously.



--The Integrated Case Flow Management System will develop a

business process to streamline and integrate all relevant aspects of a

case as it moves through the value chain.



SOCA (Sexual Offences and Community Affairs) Programme includes:



--Awareness Campaigns to make women and children aware of their

basic human rights.



--Case Managers to fast track the case flow through the system.



--Victim Assistance Programme to help strengthen the capacities of

victims.



--The development of a Sexual Offences Training Guide.



--The development of a Domestic Violence Training Guide.



--Management Development Programme to teach strategic management,

leadership and project management in the SOCA environment.



Justice College



--Tutor Training Project aimed at providing basic skills and to

broaden the perspectives and widen the horizons of the prosecutors and

magistrates in previously disadvantaged areas.



Outsourcing of Trust Fund Management



--Outsourcing to organisations better geared to dealing with the

receipt and payment of high volumes of cash.



PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SECURITY IN THE RSA: COMPETITION OR

CO-OPERATION?*



Prof Mike Hough



Director: Institute for Strategic Studies



University of Pretoria



1. INTRODUCTION



Various factors have led to the phenomenal growth of the private

security industry in South Africa. The increase in crime, as well as

perceptions and realities regarding the efficient functioning of the

South African Police Service (SAPS), and metro policing, are among the

main factors in this regard. More recently, attention has been focused

on improving the regulation of the private security industry, and

increasingly appeals are made for closer co-operation between the SAPS

and private security. It remains to be seen whether increased efficiency

on the part of the SAPS or the introduction of metro policing in cities

where this does not yet exist, will diminish the need for private

security.



In this article, an overview of the private security sector in

South Africa and the kinds of services rendered, is given; followed by

selected official South African views on private security and current

initiatives to regulate the industry. This is followed by an assessment

of the current as well as potential role that private security could

play in combating crime.



2. INDIVIDUAL SECURITY AND NATIONAL SECURITY



Increased emphasis on the concept of 'human security',

and at times even equating it to national security, has meant that crime

has been recognised as one of the obvious threats to human security.

However, it is often, from a human security and/or a national security

point of view, not combated effectively.



The two basic components of human security are freedom from fear

and freedom from want. Threats to human security are listed as being

threats to the following areas (although they tend to overlap), namely

economic security, food security, health security, environmental

security, personal security, community security and political security.

Each of these are seen to require certain conditions, such as a basic

income, and physical and economic access to basic food. (1))



Part of the problem regarding an excessive focus on human security

is its affordability to the state. Has the threat to individual security

reached the stage where it has already, or may soon, become a threat to

national security? To what extent does the state have a definite legal

obligation to provide aspects of human security; and what is the

distinction between the causes, potential causes or potential

manifestations of threats to national security and the actual

manifestations of these threats? These are often confused.



Threats to human security, such as poverty, could therefore exist

without this necessarily manifesting (or even potentially manifesting)

as a threat to national security. It has been argued that only if a

certain condition or situation leads to violence, unacceptable conflict

or state instability, or has the clear potential to do so (including

existing indications to this effect), could it possibly be viewed as a

national security threat. In this regard, threats to law and order are

not necessarily threats to national security, nor is normal national or

international competition. The intensity, extent and consequences of for

instance violent crime, will determine in a given situation whether it

is a threat to individual security and law and order, or also a threat

to national security. It has of course also been said that a threat is a

threat to national security when a government says it is. This is,

however, insufficient, as governments often list priorities for the sake

of political expediency, or under- or over-emphasise certain threats.

Threats or potential threats from the same source, for example the

environment, may pose a threat to individual security only, or to

individual and national (and possibly also global) security.



In the Third World context specifically, it has been argued that

threats to national security must ultimately have a political dimension.

(2)) Although the concept of "security software" is especially

important in the Third World context, over-emphasis of this dimension

could lead to utopian thinking, particularly when divorced from national

security.



Despite the difficulty of finding a universally acceptable

definition of human security and its link with national security, the

Memorandum of Understanding on Security, Stability, Development and

Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA--July 2002) stipulates that by 2005, a

framework for codifying the concept of human security into national laws

as contained in the CSSDCA Solemn Declaration, should be established.

(3))



As far as the latter is concerned, it is inter alia stated that:

(4))





(b)The concept of security must embrace all aspects of society

including economic, political and social and environmental dimensions

of the individual, family, and community, local and national

life. The security of a nation must be based on the security of

the life of the individual citizens to live in peace and to satisfy

basic needs while being able to participate fully in societal affairs

and enjoying freedom and fundamental human rights.

The above does not specifically refer to the concept national

security (although it refers to stability), and obviously takes a wide

view of security with the emphasis on human security.



Definitions of 'human security' (although the concept has

obvious merits), have been criticised for often being too vague and

wide, and that virtually any type of threat or even discomfort, could

constitute a threat to human security. It also does not help

decision-makers in deciding on the allocation of scarce resources among

competing goals if no hierarchy of security objectives is established.

"After all, not everything can be a matter of national security

with all of the urgency that this term implies". (5))



An over-emphasis of human security can also create false priorities

and a false sense of hope, as well as false assumptions, as the

alleviation of human insecurity does not necessarily mean greater peace

and security. (6)) Many 'human security' issues are in fact

service delivery issues, some at local level.



Human insecurity is often at least partially the result of bad

governance or an emphasis on regime security instead of national

security. Buzan also pertinently states that national and international

security cannot be reduced to individual security. The pursuit of

individual security may also lead to conflict with the state, and

individual security may be affected both positively and negatively by

the state. (7))



Although all threats to human security are not automatically

threats to national security, crime for instance is often not

sufficiently viewed as a threat to human security, or in some instances

to both human and national security. In the case of South Africa, it

could be argued that crime is a serious threat to both individual

security and to national security. Recognising this as such is, however,

only a first step, as an unacceptable gap often exists between policy

and effective implementation.



It is therefore clear that while countering all threats to

individual security lies beyond the capacity of the state, despite

undertakings contained in the Bills of Human Rights, certain basic state

functions and responsibilities do exist. One of the prime functions in

this regard is to provide an acceptable level of national and individual

security. Whether due to a lack of resources on the part of the state; a

lack of political will; inefficient service provision; increasing crime

levels; or a need for added security, those that can afford it have

increasingly been making use of private security, also in South Africa.



3. THE PRIVATE SECURITY INDUSTRY IN SOUTH AFRICA: EXTENT AND ROLE



Private security has been described as "those efforts by

individuals and organisations to protect their assets from loss, harm or

reduction in value, due to criminality". (8)) In this regard, the

protection of assets in the business, commerce and industry environment

is the basic function of private security. These assets may include

people, fixed and immovable property, business rights, information,

contracts, etc. Private security though, also plays a role in the

protection of private individuals and their property on a client basis.

The above functions are performed by managing the potential or actual

losses incurred by, or resulting from crime. Crime prevention, also in

the form of deterrence, as well as investigations, may constitute part

of the function.



The Private Security Industry Regulation Act, 2001 (Act No 56 of

2001) provides an extensive list of services qualifying as security

services. The Act defines security services as meaning one or more of

the following services or activities:



(a) Protecting or safeguarding a person or property in any manner;



(b) giving advice on the protection or safeguarding of a person or

property, or on any other type of security service as defined in this

section, or on the use of security equipment;



(c) providing a reactive or response service in connection with the

safeguarding of a person or property in any manner;



(d) providing a service aimed at ensuring order and safety on the

premises used for sporting, recreational, entertainment or similar

purposes;



(e) manufacturing, importing, distributing or advertising of

monitoring devices contemplated in section 1 of the Interception and

Monitoring Prohibition Act, 1992 (Act No. 127 of 1992);



(f) performing the functions of a private investigator;



(g) providing security training or instruction to a security

service provider or prospective security service provider;



(h) installing, servicing or repairing security equipment;



(i) monitoring signals or transmissions from electronic security

equipment;



(j) performing the functions of a locksmith;



(k) making a person or the services of a person available, whether

directly or indirectly, for the rendering of any service referred to in

paragraphs (a) to (j) and (l), to another person;



(l) managing, controlling or supervising the rendering of any of

the services referred to in paragraphs (a) to (l);



(m) creating the impression, in any manner, that one or more of the

services referred to in paragraphs (a) to (l) are rendered. (9))



A security service provider is defined as "a person who

renders a security service to another for a remuneration, reward, fee or

benefit and includes such a person who is not registered as required in

terms of this Act". It has to be noted that in terms of the Act,

all in-house security officers are also obliged to register as well as,

for example, private investigators. (10))



A broad distinction can be made between contract security and

in-house security as far as the private security industry in South

Africa is concerned. Three types of services are basically provided,

namely a guarding service, an armed response service, and

cash-in-transit operations. (11))



Larger organisations may have in-house security, which refers to a

security department, protection department or risk management structure

within the organisation itself. Contract security may be combined with

inhouse security, with each performing specific functions. Some mining

houses, local authorities and financial institutions, for instance, make

use of in-house security. The trend, however, is to outsource guarding

services specifically to contract security. (12))



In addition to being providers of certain services, the private

security industry also provides a range of electronic and other security

equipment such as intrusion detection equipment, vehicle security

systems and access control systems. Finally, private investigations and

industrial espionage and counter-espionage are also functions provided

by certain individuals or companies in the private security sector.

(13))



By August 2003, the private security industry had 250 852 active

security officers, and 4 271 registered security businesses. The

industry has been growing at a rate of 12,5 per cent per annum over the

last five years, and was estimated to have an annual turnover of R13

billion by 2003. Foreign investment in the industry is estimated to be

more than R3 billion. (14)) A wide variety of services are rendered, and

the categories of services registered with the Regulatory Authority are

indicated in the table below. A security business may render any number

of these services.



The ratio of active private security personnel to uniformed police

officers in South Africa is approximately 2,5:1. (15)) This is based on

a total number of uniformed police of 101 022 by October 2002. (16))



4. SELECTED OFFICIAL SOUTH AFRICAN VIEWS REGARDING THE PRIVATE

SECURITY INDUSTRY



Before discussing the contribution of South Africa's private

security industry to the prevention and combating of crime, and the

possibility of closer co-operation with the SAPS, some official views on

the private security industry first need to be considered. It is clear

that the South African authorities have, for various reasons since 1994,

tended to harbour some reservations about private security.



During 1995, although crediting private security with the role

played at for instance a number of public buildings and airports

following the privatisation of security, the then Deputy Minister of

Intelligence Services, Joe Nhlanhla, stated the following: (17))





Concern, however, is expressed over allegations against a number

of private companies, particularly in strife-torn areas, suspected

of being involved in criminal and unconstitutional activities.

Government is also concerned about the training of units, hit squads

and private armies that are involved in the massacre of people.

It is the legitimate right of companies to train bodyguards and

installation guards.... But, there is the perception that third force

elements see the private security industry as a haven from where

to continue their third force activities of destabilisation.



It does seem that some private security firms are being used

as cover for arms trade, rhino-horn smuggling, drug trafficking

and illicit diamond dealings both in South Africa and beyond

international borders. Industrial espionage seems to be a new

area of interest.

Some reservations regarding the role of certain "private

security and intelligence companies" were also expressed by the

South African Coordinator for Intelligence, Linda Mti, during 1997. He

stated that: (18))



Some of the greatest concerns that exist in respect of private

security and intelligence companies revolve around the following issues:



--the weaponry they have in their possession;



--their historical links with the previous regime's security

services;



--the involvement of anti-government elements who are using the

infrastructure of the industry to train, equip, channel and manage

anti-constitutional and criminal activities;



--the connections some of the actors in the private security

companies have with foreign intelligence services and the similarity of

objectives informed by their past co-operation in the Cold War era, ...

which makes them free agents to be exploited for espionage activities;

and



--their mercenary-type role in foreign affairs.



From an intelligence perspective, which is not driven by profit or

commercial interest, these activities bring the entire private security

industry into disrepute. While that is the case, it is known that many

of the companies and individuals involved in the industry are patriots.

They can be relied upon when it comes to the defence of South

Africa's national sovereignty and territorial integrity. Thus they

are intent on cleaning up the industry. In co-operation with private

companies, including private security companies, these patriots form a

crucial building block in the campaign of waging war against crime.



Mti made some distinction between what he called private security

companies and private intelligence companies, and pointed out that no

legal provision is made for the latter, although the Interception and

Monitoring Prohibition Act, 1992 (Act No 127 of 1992) is relevant in

this regard. His concern over private intelligence was expressed as

follows: (19))





In order to remain competitive, most successful business ventures

have established and operate their own intelligence capabilities to

identify opportunities and to protect their production processes

and technologies. Their existence is understood, not condoned.

What is objectionable is the development of covert collection

capabilities by private intelligence companies, and their use of

these capabilities in total disregard of the Constitution and other

legislation. This is cause for concern.

The General Intelligence Law Amendment Act, 2000 (Act No 66 of

2000) also places restrictions on the employment of members of the

National Intelligence Agency (NIA) or the South African Secret Service

(SASS) in the private security industry for a period of three years

after leaving the Agency or the Service unless a clearance certificate

is provided by the Director-General. (20))



During 2000, official concern over the role of some private

security companies was again expressed. The Director-General of NIA

stated that quite a few of these companies are "intelligence

companies", parading as research or investigation institutions. The

Joint Standing Committee on Intelligence (JSCI) was investigating ways

to exercise some or other form of control over these companies. (21))



In a subsequent development the Chairperson of the Parliamentary

Portfolio Committee on Safety and Security spoke out strongly against

foreign involvement in the private security industry in South Africa. It

was reported that during 2000 alone, foreign companies had invested more

than R1,7 billion in buying security companies in South Africa. The 11

September 2001 terror attacks in the United States (US) seemed to have

played a major role in the South African government's view on

foreign ownership of private security in South Africa. (22)) In the

Private Security Industry Regulation Act, 2001, the requirements for

registration subsequently included that only citizens or permanent

residents of South Africa may apply for registration as security service

providers. (23)) The same applies to a security business. Foreign

investment in such a company remains admissible.



5. REGULATING THE PRIVATE SECURITY INDUSTRY IN SOUTH AFRICA



The Security Officers" Act, 1987 (Act No 92 of 1987) created a

now defunct statutory body, the Security Officers' Board, to

exercise control over the occupation of security officers, and also

provided for the compulsory registration of all contract security

officers with the Board. The Board could take such steps as were

necessary to maintain standards and regulate practices for security

officers. It also took measures deemed expedient or necessary in

connection with the training of security officers, the determination of

the standards of such training, and the promotion of the maintenance of

those standards. (24))



Regulations were promulgated in 1992 relating to the training of

security officers, the levels of training and content of courses being

determined by the Board. Following training, security officers are

graded from A (highest) to E (lowest). A security service may not be

rendered by an employee of a private security firm unless the employee

is in possession of a training certificate issued by the Board. (25))



The Security Officers' Amendment Act, 1997 (Act No 104 of

1997) replaced the Security Officers' Board with a Security

Officers' Interim Board, which continued the functions of the

previous Board. In addition, it advised the Minister of Safety and

Security on the establishment of a restructured permanent board. (26))



During 2001, the Private Security Industry Regulation Act, 2001 was

adopted by Parliament, and signed by the President in January 2002,

replacing most of the provisions of the Security Officers" Act,

1987. The aims of the Security Industry Regulatory Authority established

in terms of the new legislation, are as follows: (27))



3. The primary objects of the Authority are to regulate the

security industry and to exercise effective control over the practice of

the occupation of security service provider in the public and national

interest and the interest of the security industry itself, and for that

purpose, subject to this Act, to--



(a) promote a legitimate security industry which acts in terms of

the principles contained in the Constitution and other applicable law;



(b) ensure that all security service providers act in the public

and national interest in the rendering of security services;



(c) promote a security industry which is characterised by

professionalism, transparency, accountability, equity and accessibility;



(d) promote stability of the private security industry;



(e) promote and encourage trustworthiness of security service

providers;



(f) determine and enforce minimum standards of occupational conduct

in respect of security service providers;



(g) encourage and promote efficiency in and responsibility with

regard to the rendering of security services;



(h) promote, maintain and protect the status and interests of the

occupation of security service provider;



(i) ensure that the process of registration of security service

providers is transparent, fair, objective and concluded timeously;



(j) promote high standards in the training of security service

providers and prospective security service providers;



(k) encourage ownership and control of security businesses by

persons historically disadvantaged through unfair discrimination;



(l) encourage equal opportunity employment practices in the

security industry;



(m) promote the protection and enforcement of the rights of

security officers and other employees in the private security industry;



(n) ensure that compliance with existing legislation by security

service providers is being promoted and controlled through a process of

active monitoring and investigation of the affairs of security service

providers;



(o) protect the interests of the users of security services;



(p) promote the development of security services which are

responsive to the needs of users of such services and of the community;



(q) promote the empowerment and advancement of persons who were

historically disadvantaged through unfair discrimination in the private

security industry.



Furthermore, Section 28 of the Act provides for a legally binding

code of conduct for security service providers. (28)) It should also be

noted that under the Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act No 51 of 1977),

security officers enjoy the same powers of arrest as ordinary citizens

(29)) (unless they are contracted to perform duties at national key

points).



6. THE CURRENT AND POTENTIAL ROLE OF THE PRIVATE SECURITY INDUSTRY

IN COMBATING CRIME



6.1 Current role



The current role of the private security industry in South Africa

as far as the combating of crime is concerned, is linked to the reasons

for the growth of the industry and the advantages of private security

compared with official policing. It should, however, be borne in mind

that private security is not intended to replace official policing.

(30))



--While the police service has to operate under public service

regulations, private security is more flexible as it can be more readily

adjusted to changing consumer demands.



--Public perceptions of police inefficiency and slow response times

have translated into an increased demand for private security.



--Private security has become more visible than the police

currently, and in this sense a pro-active deterrent role regarding the

combating of crime is fulfilled. It is also specifically focused on

protecting a specific victim. Official policing has increasingly tended

to become reactive.



--The huge market for industrial, commercial and residential

security in South Africa, means that the police cannot meet the demands

due to its limited resources, and are for instance incapable of

producing visible security on a 24-hour basis in most instances.



--Access control and the development of mass private property such

as large shopping centres, have generated an increased need for security

which the police mostly cannot provide.



--The private security industry is a provider of security systems

such as burglar alarms and closed-circuit television cameras (CCTV),

with the latter being seen as increasingly important in combating crime.



--Increasingly, insurance companies are insisting on private

security measures such as links with armed response.



Some private security companies claim that in their areas of

operation, crime has been reduced to between 75 per cent and 90 per

cent. (31))



6.2 Potential role



It has been stated that the distinction between public and private

policing has already become blurred since armed response services

rendered by private security companies already imply performing some

traditional police duties. The same applies to the patrolling of certain

streets by private security officers. Functions such as eviction and the

policing of illegal strikes have also involved private security. (32))



Although the extension of the powers of private security has

received considerable attention, it is stressed that the primary role of

private security is to serve a specific client for profit. Assisting

more actively in combating crime in general would therefore be a

secondary role, The Security Officers' Board nevertheless submitted

a policy paper to Government inter alia requesting peace officer status

for certain categories of private security guards. This would include

full powers of arrest, search and seizure. (33))



Although no formal co-operation agreement exists between the SAPS

and the private security industry, it has been reported that the SAPS

views the provision of crime intelligence and information, as well as a

visible presence by private security, as important factors in combating

crime. On local level, some informal co-operation does exist, for

example in various Cape Town suburbs. (34)) An indication has been given

that the SAPS Commissioner would meet with representatives of the

Regulatory Authority to discuss formal co-operation, but this does not

seem to have materialised yet.



A number of other potential roles have also been suggested by

academics and analysts. These include the following: (35))



--Forensic investigations, such as the photographing of crime

scenes on behalf of the SAPS.



--Criminal investigations which are already being carried out by

private security (for example regarding commercial crime) could be

expanded to include crimes where specialised detection skills are

required and where this is available in the private sector.



--Transporting prisoners.



--Guards for state-owned premises and for individual state

officials still guarded by the SAPS.



--Increased responsibility for security at private functions such

as sport events.



--Aspects of police officer training.



--Court-orderly duties.



Some other potential functions have also been suggested such as

certain justice and prison-related activities, but the point is that

where some of these functions are out-sourced, these need not

necessarily be to private security companies.



7. PROBLEMATIC ISSUES



A number of problematic issues, however, surround the idea of an

expanded role for private security, Firstly, the issue of cost.

Taxpayers may well argue that they are entitled to better policing.

Forcing the public (and only some can afford it) to rely increasingly on

private security, could be viewed as a dereliction of government

responsibilities. In this regard the following has been remarked:

"Meanwhile, at the beginning of the year most monitoring and armed

reaction companies raised their fees quite steeply--in some cases as

much as 25 per cent. This is way ahead of the inflation rate and is

quite alarming.... Far from being a boon, security is becoming a problem

in that its cost is constantly increasing". (36)) Recent mergers in

the security industry could strengthen the trend towards monopolies and

higher costs. It is estimated that the number of major operators could

decrease from 12 in 2001 to about five in 2005. (37))



Secondly, it has been stated that "private security companies

police for profit and are accountable to their clients. Extending the

power of private security guards will effectively give those who employ

these guards, powers and rights the general public will not have".

(38))



Thirdly, while the police are accountable to various levels of

government and the electorate, private security companies are primarily

accountable to their clients and shareholders. (39))



Fourthly, the fact that the deterrence of crime is enhanced by the

arrest and punishment of criminals, in which the police play a major

role, is contrasted with the fact that although visible private security

also has a deterrent effect, the main objective of the latter is

reduction of the risk of crime and loss. Furthermore the increased

establishment of "enclaves" protected by private security

could merely lead to crime relocating to other areas that are not

protected in this manner. (40))



Other issues that are mentioned (also in the context of the current

role of private security) include the following: (41))



--Overburdening of the police who respond to false alarms that are

not linked to reaction and do not always meet acceptable security

equipment standards.



--Training standards which, although regulated by the security

industry, are sometimes viewed as inadequate. This especially applies to

firearm training and the training of grade D and E guards.



--Criminal behaviour by security officers, such as involvement in

cash-in-transit robbery, housebreaking, etc, as well as other improper

conduct (for example, between 1995 and 2000, 1 835 improper conduct

enquiries were instituted).



--Underpayment of guards which led to a major strike during 2001.



--The use of unregistered security officers.



--The ability of the private security industry to cope with

increasingly violent, more sophisticated and large-scale attacks, such

as cash-in-transit robberies.



--Unfavourable ratios of 800 to 1 400 customers per single armed

reaction vehicle in some cases.



It should of course be taken into account that many police officers

are not well-trained either, with approximately one third of the SAPS

currently illiterate. Significant numbers of police officers are also

facing criminal charges or disciplinary hearings. (42)) The absence of a

permanent solution to crime in South Africa also results in a situation

where there is a shift in crime from targets protected by private

security to softer targets. (43))



A number of issues were also raised in reaction to the publication

of the first draft of the Security Industry Regulation Bill. The South

African Police Union (SAPU) objected to the prohibition on inter alia

members of the police and the military to register as security officers.

The long delays in the registering of new security officers with the

former Security Officers' Board was also mentioned. (44))

Subsequently, dissatisfaction with the functioning of the Security

Industry Regulatory Authority has been expressed on a number of

occasions. (45))



8. CONCLUSION



In the policy paper submitted to the Minister of Safety and

Security by the Security Officers' Interim Board during 2000, it

was stated that "(t)he Board proceeds from the premise that the

strategic crime prevention and crime fighting roles of private security

will continue to expand in the foreseeable future". (46)) An appeal

was also made for a "working partnership" between public

police and private security, and it was stated that the strategic

importance of the security industry is self-evident from a safety and

security perspective. (47))



Undoubtedly private security does contribute to the prevention of

crime, and in fact may, if the service had not existed, also have led to

an increase in vigilante actions. It is nevertheless clear that private

security cannot replace public policing and also that a formal

co-operation agreement between the police and the private security

industry on national level is not imminent. The increased and more

efficient regulation of the private security industry as envisaged in

the Private Security Industry Regulation Act, 2001 will hopefully also

lead to higher standards of service and professionalism in the industry,

and contribute to its ability to play an important role in the combating

of crime. A realisation that crime in South Africa is not only a threat

to human security but more specifically that the extent of serious crime

has implications for national security, is required as a first step in

the more effective combating of crime, also by the official policing

agencies.





Table 1:



Operational Results: Rural Safeguarding



Financial Year



Focus Area 2001/2002 2002/2003



Stolen vehicles recovered 167 698

Illegal immigrants apprehended 11 129 10 185

Narcotics in tablet form confiscated 320 7 973

Narcotics--dagga confiscated 11 851 kg 93 922 kg

Illegal and unlicensed firearms confiscated 520 2 071

Stolen stock recovered 919 2 008

Suspects arrested 2 500 10 169



Table 2:



Operational Results: Borderline Control



Financial Year



Focus Area 2001/2002 2002/2003



Stolen vehicles recovered 138 196

Illegal immigrants apprehended 63 186 47 323

Narcotics in tablet form confiscated 20 586 2

Narcotics--dagga confiscated 40 342 kg 18 788 kg

Illegal and unlicensed firearms confiscated 214 133

Stolen stock recovered 661 229

Suspects arrested 822 523



REGISTERED CATEGORIES OF PRIVATE SECURITY SERVICES

IN SOUTH AFRICA



Security services Number of

security

businesses



Guarding and/or patrolling: Commercial, industrial or 3 014

residential

Safeguarding assets in transit, providing security 685

transport

Providing close personal protection / body guarding 946

Providing advice on the protection of persons or property, 335

any other security service or the use of security

equipment

Providing reaction or response services 339

Ensuring safety and order on premises (sporting, 984

recreational and entertainment)

Manufacturing, importing, distributing or advertising of 141

monitoring devices

Functioning as private investigators 855

Providing security training or instruction 951

Installing, servicing or repairing security equipment 428

Providing services of a locksmith 260

Monitoring signals from electronic security equipment 1 111

(security control room)

Making persons or their services available for rendering a 994

security service

Providing security at special events 676

Car watch or related activities 223



Source: Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority, Research

Enquiry, 28 August 2003.

* This article is an updated version of ISSUP Bulletin 4/2002,

originally written by Col Barry Schoeman, Senior Staff Officer,

Operations Land Internal and Borderline Control, Joint Operations

Division, SA National Defence Force.



# Updated version of an article first published in the Strategic

Review for Southern Africa, Vol XXIV, No 2, November 2002.



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(4.) Organisation of African Unity, CSSDCA, Solemn Declaration,

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(9.) Republic of South Africa, Private Security Industry Regulation

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(10.) Ibid, sections 1 and 20.



(11.) Bosch, J G S, op cit, p 5.



(12.) Ibid, pp 5-6.



(13.) Ibid, pp 6-7.



(14.) Private Security Industry Regulatory Authority, Research

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(15.) Security Focus, January 2003, p 4.



(16.) SAPS Profile, http://www.saps.gov.za/profile.



(17.) Nhlanhla, J, "Challenges facing the Intelligence

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(18.) Mti, L M, "The role of the Intelligence Services and

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(19.) Ibid, pp 10-11.



(20.) Republic of South Africa, General Intelligence Law Amendment

Ac> 2000 (Act No 66 of 2000), section 22E.



(21.) Beeld (Johannesburg), 20 April 2000.



(22.) Business Day (Johannesburg), 27 September 2001.



(23.) Republic of South Africa, Private Security Industry

Regulation Act, 2001, op cit, section 23.



(24.) Republic of South Africa, Security Officers Ac> 1987 (Act

No 92 of 1987), section 3.



(25.) Republic of South Africa, Government Gazette, No 14178, 31

July 1992.



(26.) Republic of South Africa, Security Officers Amendment Act

1997 (Act No 104 of 1997), section 12.



(27.) Republic of South Africa, Private Security Industry

Regulation Act, 2001, op cit, section 3.



(28.) Ibid, section 28.



(29.) Republic of South Africa, Criminal Procedure Act, 1977 (Act

No 51 of 1977).



(30.) Schonteich, M, "Fighting crime with private muscle: The

private sector and crime prevention", African Security Review, Vol

8, No 5, 1999, p 67.



(31.) Business Report (Johannesburg), 6 December 2001.



(32.) Irish, J, "Policing for profit", ISS Monograph

Series, No 39, August 1999, p 29; and The Star (Johannesburg), 9 March

2001.



(33.) Security Officers' Board, Policy Paper, 21 May 2000, p

220.



(34.) Schonteich, M, op cit, p 68; and Security Focus, January

2003, p 44.



(35.) Minnaar, A, "Partnership policing", African

Security Review, Vol 8, No 2, 1999, pp 45-46.



(36.) Security Focus, April, Vol 18, No 4, 2000, p 4.



(37.) Business Report (Johannesburg), 6 December 2001.



(38.) Irish, J, op cit, p 30.



(39.) Ibid, p 9.



(40.) Ibid, pp 9-11.



(41.) Minnaar, A, op cit, pp 46-49; Beeld (Johannesburg), 7 March

2001; Beeld (Johannesburg), 6 March 2001; The Star (Johannesburg), 4

January 2001; Security Officers' Interim Board, Statistics for

2000, March 2001; and Business Report (Johannesburg), 6 December 2001.



(42.) Rapport (Johannesburg), 25 February 2001.



(43.) Business Report (Johannesburg), 6 December 2001.



(44.) Sake Beeld (Johannesburg), 29 August 2000.



(45.) See for instance Security Focus, May 2003, p 4.



(46.) Security Officers' Board, Policy Paper, op cit, p 4.



(47.) Ibid, p 39.